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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
EL RAY DAVIS and MERELDA
V. DAVIS, husband and wife,

]
]
Plaintiffs/Appellee ])

vs.

APPELLANTS BRIEF

;

LARRY BUD JOHNSON, ARCHIE
DEAN JOHNSON, MARJORIE
JOHNSON and STELLA JOHNSON

]i
]
]

Civil No. 950553-CA

Defendants/Appellant]
I. JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from Summary Judgment in favor plaintiffs
granted by the Fourth Circuit Court, Spanish Fork division, Utah
County, State of Utah.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to

UCA §78-2a-3(2) (d) " appeals from the circuit courts, except for
those from the small claims department of a circuit court. "
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A. ISSUE
located

Whether an easement existed in use of structures

on the property

Defendants/Appellants

of Plaintiffs/Appellees

that was continuous

in favor of

in nature from its

inception in approximately 1964.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that
there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts
and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the losing party. And in deciding whether the
trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to
the prevailing party, we give no deference to the trial

favorable to the losing party. And in deciding whether the
trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to
the prevailing party, we give no deference to the trial
court's view of the law; we review it for correctness. Ron
Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomauist 773 P.2d 1382,1385(Ut.
1989).

1.

III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
URCP 56(c):
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from an order granting Summary Judgment in
favor of plaintiffs on the basis that there was no
genuine

issue of material

fact and plaintiffs were

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R at 17).
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The

plaintiffs

filed

a Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment on the 26th day of July, 1994. (R at 7).
4th

day

of

August,

1994,

the

defendants

On the

filed

a

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R at 9). On the 10th day of August, 1994 plaintiffs
filed a Reply Memorandum.

(R at 12). A hearing was held

on the 25th day of August, 1994 and the court entered a
minute ruling on the 25th day of August, 1994. (R at 15).
11

filed on the 15th day of September, 1995. (R at 35).
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELATED TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW.
In 1964 the Appellees' mother, Ada Johnson, owned two parcels
of real property in Santaquin, Utah. (R at 2).

After she died, the

State sold portions of lot one and .two, while allowing the estate
to transfer a portion to Appellees.

(R at 2).

The portion

transferred to Appellees had been put to a farming use from at
least 1964, and which was continuously used as farm land until the
summer of 1994. (R at 2 and 10).

The property deeded to the

plaintiffs included fencing, barns, and structures for animals. (R
at 10). The barns, fenced areas and structures were used from at
least 1964 to 1994 to support farming on appellees!lot. (R at 10)
The

structures

purchased.

and

(R at 10).

use

were

obvious

when

the

property

was

The court held that, despite the long use,

that no easement existed in favor of defendants.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

Implied Easements are well recognized in Utah law.

At

the summary judgment hearing, there was no dispute that the four
elements of implied easements existed with regard to this property:
1.

Unity of Title followed by severance;

2.

Obvious servitude at the time of severance;

3.

Easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the
dominant estate;

4.

The easement is continuous and self acting.

The only

issue that existed was whether or not implied
3

easements are limited to passage, or whether they can be extended
to other types of user.
B.

Implied easements are for use, and for the type of

historic use, experienced by the property.

That use may be

recreation, passage, grazing or use of buildings, but it is
appropriate to recognize that implied easement does exist for other
than ingress and egress.
VI. ARGUMENT
THE FACTS ARE UNDISPUTED
Rule 56(c) of the URCP allows for summary judgment only after
two hurdles are met: (1) there must be no genuine issues of
material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a

matter

of

law.

The

following

facts

are

undisputed

and

controlling in this matter:
1.

The barns, used for farm animals and fencing were in

open, visible and obvious use since at least 1964 until 1994.

(R

at 10).
2.

There was unity of title in Ada Johnson for all the

property involved in this dispute from 1964 until sheriff's sale in
1987.

(R at 2).

The barns and other structures located on

appellees' property were reasonably necessary for the farming
conducted by Appellants on the dominant estate.

(R at 10). The

use of the easement was continuous. (R at 10).

No issue of

material fact existed.
However, plaintiffs/appellees were not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law because the foregoing constituted an implied
4

easement in favor of defendants/appellants.

This appeal has been

brought to confirm an easement by implication existing in favor of
appellants for use of the property.
POINT II.
APPELLANTS HAVE AN IMPLIED EASEMENT OVER APPELLEES' PROPERTY
Utah case law has long recognized implied easements. However,
the problem before the court is whether implied easements exist for
user other than egress and ingress.
Two leading cases which set out the elements for implied
easement in Utah are Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150(Ut App. 1989) and
Tschagqeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d
277(Ut 1976).

In Butler, a restaurant was built on property owned

by Jack Hill.

Mr. Hill leased the restaurant to the defendants,

and later built a storage unit on adjoining property.

To use the

storage units, a portion of the parking lot attached to the
restaurant was needed to provide room to manuever boats and R.V.'s
for parking in the storage units. This was an open and obvious use
of the property during the term of the lease.

Mr. Hill was later

divorced from plaintiff, Mary Butler, who received the storage
units in the property settlement. Mr. Hill sold the restaurant to
defendants Lee.

Defendants tried to limit access to the storage

units over their parking lot area and plaintiff Butler sued to
establish an easement over the parking lot in favor of the storage
units. The Butler court quoted Adamson v. Brockbank, 12 Ut.2d 52,
185 P.2d 264, 270-272(1947) as follows:
[I]n general terms, the rule may be stated that when an owner
of the tract of land has arranged and adapted the various
5

parts so that one derives the benefit and advantage from the
other of a continuous and obvious character, and he sells one
of the parts without making mention of the incidental
advantage or burdens of one in respect to the other, there is
implied an understanding and agreement that such advantages
and burdens continue as before the separation of title.
Butler 774 P.2d at 1153.
The Tschaggenv court was asked to determine whether a land
locked lot had an implied easement over a neighboring lot for
passage where there was no servitude at the time of severance of
title.

The court, in discussing implied easements, stated that

!f

in such a case, the easement must be apparent, obvious, and

visible". Tschaggenv 555 P. 2d at 280.

The court further stated

that the following four elements must be met prior to finding an
implied easement:
1.

Unity of title followed by severance;

2.

That at the time of the severance, the servitude was
apparent, obvious, and visible;

3.

That the easement is reasonably necessary
enjoyment of the dominant estate; and

4.

It must usually be continuous and self-acting, as
distinguished from one used only from time to time when
occasion arises. Tschaggenv at id.

to

the

The easement was not found for failure of obvious servitude at
the time of severance.

However, all elements of prescriptive

easements do exist in this action.

The record shows that the

property of appellants and appellees had unity of title in the
Estate of Ada Johnson before severance in 1987.

(R at 2).

At the

time of severance in 1987, the servitude and use of the barns and
land for livestock was apparent, obvious and visible (R at 10).
The use of the barns and land
6

for livestock was reasonably

necessary for the use of the dominant farming estate. (R at 10).
Further, there was no dispute that this was a continuous and selfacting use by defendants of the property from 1964 through the time
of severance in 1987, and continueing until 1994.

(R at 10). An

implied easement should exist.
POINT III.
EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION IS NOT LIMITED TO PASSAGE
The legal dispute that exists between the parties is: whether
an easement by implication can exist when it is for user other than
passage. Only one case on point has been found by appellants. In
Brown v. Haley,355 S.E.2d 563(Va. 1987) the plaintiff, as the owner
of property, had sold a portion of the property above the 800 foot
elevation contour to Haley, who developed a campsite and water
recreation resort next to a proposed lake to be located on Brown's
property to the 800 feet level.

The lake did not reach the 800

foot contour level when fully filled.

Therefore Haley, and those

who used his property, had to cross and use for recreational
activities lake-side land owned by Brown in order to be able to
enjoy and use the lake. There was no written easement in favor of
Haley for this use.

However, the Brown court held that such use

was "reasonable and necessary for the enjoyment of the property.".
Brown 355 S.E. 2d at 569.

The court further held that:

When a landowner conveys a portion of his land, he impliedly
conveys an easement for any use that is continuous, apparent,
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property
conveyed, and in existence at the of the conveyance. Brown at
id.

7

In this matter, the estate of Ada Johnson
appellants

property

which relied

upon use of

conveyed

to

the barns and

structures was reasonable and necessary for its continued use as a
farm. All of the other requirements for implied easement have been
met in this matter.

Based upon the facts, and the long-standing

servitude of appellees land, an implied easement exists in favor of
appellants for the use of the barns and other structures.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed facts show that the property which appellants
received from the Ada Johnson estate had continuous, obvious and
apparent use of barns, pigsties and fence which were reasonably
necessary for the enjoyment of the property.

An implied easement

should therefore have been found in favor of appellants by the
lower courts.

DATED this

S^

day of

Richard C. Coxson
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

Z? day of

1996, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true an^correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to the following:
MITCH MAUGHAN
1172 E. HWY #1
P.O. BOX 67
PAYSON, UT 84651
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Richard"C. ^^ckon
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.00
RECORDED FOR UTAH DEPT SOCIAL

SHERIFFS DEER
Made this
D

*y.id. .^..?*te«an_

_

_

SS>S

J5.th_ day of ......October

Sheriff of

Utah

BK 2 ^ 7 0

P6

7&i

._ A.D. 19.8.7 .„ between

County. State of Utah, party of the flcst part, and

lervlCfel U ^ * h | - y ^ . . £k™^
J « P A t C « c n t . . p X . . 5 Q C ? i . 4 l . party of the second part.
W l t . \ B s S C T H . WHEREAS. In and by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Court
«f (he Fou-ch Judicial District ( Utah County ) of the State of Utah on the
3rd
day of
March
A.D. 1?.?7 9 i n a certain action then pending in said G « n . wherein ..Sta,tft..Ql...U.taJU^Jby.Jinri t h r o u g h —

Utah State DepartmeAt of JSpcjlaAJ5e.raic.ts.
Ptaintiff.....*nd . . A r c h i e . J D ^ J j ? M ^ J ) j t . . S t ^ l . « . J . Q h w l . Q R , . .

Harjorie Jotesoa, I^rry B. ^
Johnson Larsen and NormaJohns cm Hansen^

.JSiU!£a%JiJrt&^
_

.._ Defendant?.
it was among other things ordered and adjudged that ail and singular the premises in said judgment, and hereinafter described should u* sold at public auction, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of
Utah County, State
of I*tan, in the manner required by Jaw; that either of the parties to said action might become purchaser at such
sale, .ind that said Sheriff should execute the usual certificates and deeds to the purchaser as required by law.
AND WKERKAS. The Sheriff did. al the hour of
* o'clock am, on the .. 2°.t& day of .
.ApXJJL
A.D. 1 9 8 7 a t the west front iloor of the County Court House in Provo and County of Utah.
State of Utah,
after due public notice had been given, as required by law and said judgment, duly sell at public auction, agreeable
t-» law and said judgment, the premise* and property in slid judgment ar*d hereinafter described at which sale said

i»remi.«e* and property were fairly struck off uwi sold to State of Utaiu..Jby...aad^.thri)ughL«IItah ..Slate
Department of Social Services
u* the sum ot.. ..$3U5QQ~QQ.
. . Dollars, it being the highest bidder and that being the highest sum bid at said sale.

AND WIIKKJU* *»« ^ ? t & ? ^ * 5 & i a * 5 J - c S g f t - - J t t * ' L - 5 t t t * t h e r B " , 0 n * • « « • * • - "
^hwifT sain sum tf muticy tm t>«£ «nw MH? shrHrr th+nrup** mmJ« ««2 tMmue* D»* usual certificate in duplicate uf
such sale in duf farm, ami defirercd one thereof to said purchaser, and caused the other to be filed lit the office of
the County Recorder of the Counry of Utah Stare of Utah
A.V)> WMKRKAS. Mom lhm» *ix month* have elapsed i»inre the day .»/ *mi6 sale, mnd no redemption of the
prwpvrty *•• *»M has IKIMI made.
ANN WIIKHKAS. Said
purcnaseT
a* :.t»r«*<ciid diil. •»•• the
day of
A.D.
, sell assign and transfer said Certificate
t.f Sale ;ui<| all hi.* iiirhts thereunder *•»
~
the *ai«l ;tarty of* the second part, and duly authorized said Sheriff to make a deed for said premises, in pursuance
*•( KNHI *ale !•• «*anl
N o m vTrjlB 3nbrittltrr SttnfBHrS. Thai the said party »( the first part. Sheri.'f as aforesaid, in order to carry
in!** «*ff«*-t *:»id >al«* in fnimuance of said judgment and **f the law. and also in consideration ot the premises and of

th- .»...„.•> *. imi and naid by the «MI fSJill^'Icr'vtccs^ * n d ^ " " S ^ 1

Ucah

State

Department of

lit** r.-. .n»i whereof :s hereby aekiiouledged. has granted. s»4*l. ronwyed. and by lh«**e presents does grant, sell and
...ii\»-v .-.IHI .onftrm ••ni«* tin* *aid i*art\ ot thr jon-ond part, it* xuti*ea-»or* and assigns forever, the following desrrib•ti real »T4iate lying and Iwuig m **••
County
*»f
Utah.
State of L'tah. being alt the right, title, claim
and interest »f the ai»*te *«.-*fne>( «l**f.*n<lants «»f. in ami t»» lh»* following tlesrrihrd pro|ierty. tf»-wit:

Com. 26j rods North of Southwest corner of Northeast i of Sec. 2, Twp. 10 South,
Range 1 Ease, SLH; North 20 roda; East 34J rods; South 20 rods; West 34} rods
to beg.,
home 4.00
and seres
one acre
less
of sold
land^on
State
which
Road.
it stands, which is exempt
from
this less
lien theArea
AND
Com 26} rods North and 114 ft. East of the Southwest corner of Northeast i of
Sec. 2, Twp; 10 South, Range I East, SLB&M; South 57* 42' East 191 feet; North
105 feet; West 160 feet more or less to beg. Area .19 of an acre more or less*
The real property Is located at approximately 498 West Main, Santaqin, Utah,
less the house and one acre of land which It stands.
T"K«*t»**i "(th •»•) •"*• lingular the tenement*., hereditament*, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any*
*•»•.• a).|*-n:unHtg. to have ami t*» hold the same unto said party »*( the xerond part, its success*** and assigns forever.
IN WITNKSS \V)IKItK<>L\ Snul narly of the fin*t part lia*rttrreunt«* set his hand and seal the Amy and year first
alMtvo written.
Signed. Sealed n»»l l»cli\ered in pres-vtH-e «
(SEAL)
County. Utah

myum A

S T A T E OF UTAH. )
County of Utah.
)
1 9 8 7 before me
o6ut h
November
On the
" day of
Kathy Zobell
**;**
•..„
a Notary l*ublir in and for the County of Utah.
State «>f I t a h . personally appeared P ^ y i i a j ^ J f t S * ! * ? * . . . . Sheriff of
Utah
County. Statof Utah, personally known t&raejto be the per*
f«Mi demribed in and who executed the {^rn^rnnxs. \M\ramf:tk\
t who acknowledged to me that
n* surh Sheriff, freely and voluntarily, and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
WITNKSS mv hand and notarial seal, this
$ t n day of
November
Mv

••mniissmn expires

4-13-91
'

Notary PuMJj

T

•fROV(rttN!HnTtH50MPAMf
255 L100 S. PR0Y0, UTAH
Recorded at Request ottDFR HO a ^ o - j a ^ f t
at

ENT 1 * S > 5 3 BK 2 7 3 3 PG 7 ^ 0
JUMA^-REIILUIMLIiLRFrnRnFR BY MB
1??1 APR 24 2:45 Ptt FEE 8.50
RECORDED FOR PROVO LAND TITLE COMPANY

M. Fee Paid $Page

. Dep. Book.

by

Ref.:

.Address..

Mail tax notice to..

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
[CORPORATE FORM]

STATE DF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
, of County of
UTAH
, State of Utah,
grantor, Hereby QUIT CLAIMS to EL RAY DAVIS and MERELDA V. DAVIS

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

of
Ten dollars and other good and valauble considerations
the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

County,

Utah

Beginning at a point on the North l i n e of SR-6 Highway, said point South 2240.79
f e e t and East 128.52 f e e t according to Utah Coordinate Bearings Central Zone from
the North quarter corner of Section 2 , Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian; thence North 57 deg. 00' 19" West along the North l i n e of said
Highway salong a fence 150.54 f e e t t o a projected fence l i n e ; thence along said
projected fence and fence l i n e on a l l of the following courses: North 05 deg. 41 f
11" East 63.88 f e e t , North 01 deg. 35 f 43" West 244.26 f e e t , South 88 deg. 28 ! 54"
East 544.94 f e e t , South 00 deg. 18_f 23" East 370.24 f e e t , North 89 deg. 54 f 35"
West 222.85 f e e t ; thence North 02 deg. 14' 33" West 177.44 f e e t along a fence and
i t s extension; thence leaving said fence and i t s extension North 88 deg. 28' 54"
West 190.32 f e e t ; thence South 191.63 f e e t to the point of beginning.
LESS AND EXCEPTING the following:

(see

attached)

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this
day of
, A. D. 19
Attest:

fc JS.ta^fiL .of.^Utah^..D^H^S ^

Company

Secretary.
[CORPORATE SEAL]

Director, Department of/SociaiPres/deWt/
S e r v i c e s , aka-^Human Services

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

Utah

On the
Z3 ^
day of
April
1991
, A. D.
personally appeared before me Norman G. Angus
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said M nrman r A n o n c
is the director of STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES N o r m a n ^-. Angus
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation^;
of a resolution of its board of
directors and said
g
*y
each duly acknowledged to me that said corder£tionTJ
tkfc V m e *nd that the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation.
1/>? &% V A '«*:% ^

V%c
^»

^

Notary Public.

ENT1*<?33

BK 2 7 S 3 PG 7 2 1

(continued)
Beginning at a point in a fence line intersection on the Northeasterly line
of the State Highway, which point is North 505.25 feet from the center of
Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in
Utah County, Utah; thence North along a fence line 59.00 feet; thence East
313.30 feet along a fence line and extended line of a fence to a fence line;
thence South along said fence line 127.00 feet to a fence line; thence West
along said fence line 47.00 feet; thence South 108.00 feet to said Highway
line; thence North 56 deg. 22f 20" West along said Highway line 319.20 feet
to the point of beginning.

Recorded at Request of_ ORDER R O ^ i ^ ^

ENT 1 ^ . 9 5 4 BK 2 7 S 3 PG " 7 2 2
H+I1«^-i«ttHff^-<e-REC0f»etrt^ MB
1991 APR 24 2:45 Pfl FEE 9.00

at

,j£LflRQED..F.QEL££Ql[aJ^Nn TTTiF COMPANY

M. Fee Paid $.

by-

Page-

. D e p . Book-

Mail tax notice to-

Ref.:

-Address-

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
[CORPORATE F O R M ]

STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES
, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
, of County of
UTAH
, State of Utah,
grantor, hereby Q U I T CLAIMS to
EL RAY DAVIS and MERELDA V. DAVIS

of

Ten d o l l a r s and other good and valuable considerations
the following described tract
State of Utah:

of land in

Utah

grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,
County,

Commencing 26 1/2 rods North of the Southwest corner of the Northeast quarter of
Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, S a l t Lake Meridian; thence North 20
rods; thence East 34 1/2 rods; thence South 20 rods; thence West 34 1/2 rods to
beginning.
Commencing 26 1/2 rods North and 114 f e e t East of Southwest corner of Northeast
quarter of Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence South 57 deg. 42 f East 191 f e e t ; thence North 105 f e e t ; thence West 160 f e e t
more or l e s s to beginning.
LESS AND EXCEPTING the following:

(see attached)

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this
day of
, A. D. 19
Attest:

State of Utah, D-H-S•

.Company

Secretary.
[CORPORATE SEAL]

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

Utah

J

On the
2 3 ^
day of
April
1991
, A. D.
personally appeared before me Norman G. Angus
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said Norman G. Angus
is the director of STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
instrument was signed in behalf of said director by authority of a resolution of its board of
directors and said
-^S^^^^^and
each duly acknowledged to me that said
J^^StH^
same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation.
/
- >>C, ^J

li

EHT14-954-

BK 2 7 8 3 PG 7 2 3

(continued)
Beginning at a point in a fence line intersection on the Northeasterly line
of the State Highway, which point is North 505.25 feet from the center of
Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in
Utah County, Utah; thence North along a fence line 59.00 feet; thence East
313.30 feet along a fence line and extended line of a fence to a fence line;
thence South along said fence line 127.00 feet to a fence line; thence West
along said fence line 47.00 feet; thence South 108.00 feet to said Highway
line; thence North 56 deg. 22f 20" West along said Highway line 319.20 feet
to the point of beginning.
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which a violation of DR 9-102 resulted in a
In the instant appeal, I perceive a probprivate reprimand. According to Delk, of lem that may affect the entire system. I
the thirteen cases for which information am unable to discen^ from this record
was available, five resulted in a public rep- whether the Disciplinary Board has taken
rimand, six resulted in a suspension of six any precautions to insure that the punishmonths, one resulted in a suspension of ment of attorneys does not vary, without
two years, one resulted in a suspension of justification, from district to district, case
three years, and one resulted in revocation. to case, male attorney to female attorney,
Delk points out that in the cases involving black attorney to white attorney. To prothe three-year suspension and the revoca- tect against the foregoing, I would instition, the attorneys had been convicted of tute certain changes in'the way in which
crimes.
punishment is decided upon.
The information Delk has brought to the
I am not able, on this review, to deterCourt** attention suggests a need for the mine what punishment would be appropriDisciplinary Board to be attentive to the ate. I am able to say, however, that Delk
punishment meted out in similar cases as it has raised serious questions concerning the
decides the appropriate punishment in an appropriateness of a three-year suspension.
individual case. The majority upholds the I would remind the case to the Disciplinary
three-year suspension because of the facts Board with directions for it to collect inforof the instant case and because the sen- mation on the facts and punishment in all
tence is within the limits that the Board is caseB involving violations of DR 9-102, inauthorized to impose. Yet a comparison of cluding cases in which private reprimands
the facts of this case with those of the were given. I would further direct the
disciplinary cases cited by Delk indicates Disciplinary Board to reconsider Delk's
that facts such as these have not been case and to impose a punishment which
sufficient to support a penalty such as the takes into consideration Delk's misconduct
one imposed here. If this last point has in the instant case, any prior disciplinary
merit, then to say that Delk's sentence is proceedings involving Delk, and the punishwithin the limits permitted by law simply ment given other attorneys charged with
ignores a deeper problem of how the law similar violations.
has been applied.
In my view, a process such as the one I
Cases of attorney misconduct are " 'spe- have suggested would help the Disciplinary
cial proceedings, peculiar to themselves, sui Board to better judge the cases that come
generis, disciplinary in nature, and of a before it It would also tend to make the
summary character.9" Maddy v. District administration of the disciplinary system
Committee, 205 Va. 652, 658, 139 S.E.2d more uniform.
56, 60 (1964) (citations omitted). In Maddy,
we explained further that disciplinary profO flEYNUMKRSYSTEM>
ceedings were not law suits between parties, but were inquiries or inquests into the
conduct of attorneys. The Virginia State
Bar is an arm of the Court The disciplinary structure operated by the State Bar is
Rufus R. BROWN
meant to aid the Court in complying with
its bask duty to preserve the integrity of
v.
the profession. Consequently, in discipliDayton A. HALEY, et al.
nary cases, our review is different in kind
Record No. 840346.
than in a normal appeal. Cf. Blue v. Seventh District Committee, 220 Va. 1056,
Supreme Court of Virginia.
265 S.E.2d 753 (1980). In cases such as
April 24, 1987.
this, we must be concerned not only with
the proper disposition of the individual
After vendor of property had success^*8e; we must also be concerned with what
» best for the overall disciplinary system. fully brought action at law against pur-
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chasers for ejectment and damages as to
area bordering lake, purchasers sought declaratory judgment that they had easement
to cross land to reach lake waters, to reform deed, to declare that they had riparian
rights to lake, and to enjoin vendor from
further action and threats to impede their
access to lake. The Circuit Court, Franklin
County, James F. Ingram, J., determined
that purchasers, their heirs and assigns,
had implied easement to enter upon and
cross land to reach lake. Vendor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Cochran, J., held that:
(1) ejectment action brought by vendor of
land was not res judicata as to purchasers'
subsequent action for declaratory judgment that they had easement to cross vendor's land to reach lake waters; (2) evidence was sufficient to support finding
that use of property below 800-foot contour was continuous, apparent, and in existence at time of conveyance to purchasers;
and (3) evidence which showed that access
to water was within contemplation of parties in negotiating and entering into contract for sale of property was sufficient for
easement to arise by implication from
preexisting use.
Affirmed.
1. Judgment «=>591
Test to determine whether claims are
part of single cause of action, for purpose
of determining res judicata bar, is whether
same evidence is necessary to prove each
claim.
2. Ejectment *=>1
Ejectment is action at law to determine
title and right of possession of real property.

vient tract and requires that owner of that
land refrain from interfering with privilege
conferred for benefit of dominant tract.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Easements e=>38
Privilege enjoyed under easement is
not inconsistent with "a general property"
in the owner of the servientJaact
6. Easements *»61(2)
Establishment and protection of easement by injunction are equitable remedies,
and proof necessary to justify equitable
relief includes evidence of facts that give
rise to easement, whether by express grant
or reservation, by implication, or by other
means.
7. Easements «=>38
Existence of easement is not relevant
to issue of title.
8. Judgment *»747(1)
Ejectment action brought by vendor of
land was not res judicata as to purchasers'
subsequent action for declaratory judgment that they had easement to cross vendor's land to reach lake waters; none of
evidence necessary to prove easement was
necessary to determination of title in ejectment action, and had purchasers asserted
and demonstrated easement in ejection action, they could not have defeated vendor's
claim of ownership of property.
9. Deeds «=>111
Absent express restrictions imposed by
terms of grant, grantor of property conveys everything that is necessary for beneficial use and enjoyment of property.

3. Ejectment <s=>l, 95(1)
Ejectment action is concerned only
with ownership rights of plaintiff, and
proof necessary to support action consists
of documents which vest title in owner and
any other evidence related to issue of title.

10. Easements «=>43
When landowner conveys portion of
his land, he impliedly conveys easement for
any use that is continuous, apparent, reasonably necessary for enjoyment of property conveyed, and in existence at time of
conveyance.

4. Easements e»l
"Easement" is privilege to use land of
another in particular manner and for particular purpose; it creates burden on ser-

11. Easements *»36(3)
Evidence that, when purchasers were
negotiating purchase of property, vendors
had already conveyed rights to land below

BROWN v. HALEY
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800-foot contour, land had been cleared for
development of lake, and vendors were
openly exercising their reserved right to
use land below 800-foot level by grazing
their cattle there, together with existence
of recorded reservation running with land
of right to use property to reach land for
recreational purposes, was sufficient to
support finding that use of property below
800-foot contour was continuous, apparent,
and in existence at time of conveyance to
purchasers, and change in character of use,
from grazing cattle to recreational use, did
not preclude recognition of easement where
use was reasonably necessary for enjoyment of property.
12. Easements «=>36(3)
For easement to arise by implication
from preexisting use, plaintiff must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that use is
reasonable necessity, not absolute physical
necessity.
13. Easements *=>18(1)
Existence of reasonable necessity required for easement to arise by implication
from preexisting use depends on circumstances of each particular case.
14. Easements *»36(3)
Evidence which showed that access to
water was within contemplation of parties
in negotiating and entering into contract
for sale of property and that purchasers'
sole purpose in buying tract was to acquire
waterfront property for recreational use,
and that following purchase, purchasers
developed property for such use, building
beach, piers, docks, bathhouses and other
facilities related to water sports and recreation, was sufficient for easement to arise
by implication from preexisting use.
15. Easements e=>18(2)
Where parties to land transaction contemplate that purchasers will have access
to water for recreational purposes and
where such access adds materially to value
of property conveyed, use of property retained for access to water is reasonably
necessary for beneficial use and enjoyment
* Justice Cochran prepared and the Court adopted
the opinion in this case prior to the effective
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of property conveyed, for purpose of determining whether easement exists.
David A. Melesco (B. James Jefferson,
Welch & Jefferson, Rocky Mount, on brief),
for appellant
John S. Edwards (Martin, Hopkins, Lemon & Carter, P.C., Roanoke, on brief), for
appellees.
Present CARRICO, CJ., and COCHRAN,* POFF, COMPTON, STEPHENSON,
RUSSELL and THOMAS, JJ.
COCHRAN, Justice.
This appeal raises questions concerning
res judicata and an implied easement to
cross a certain strip of land for ingress and
egress to and from Smith Mountain Lake.
By deed dated September 6, 1961, Rufus
R. Brown and Sallie W. Brown conveyed to
Appalachian Power Company (Apco) the
right to overflow and affect with water
that portion of a tract of 321.75 acres to
the 800-foot elevation and to enter below
the 800-foot contour and clear the land for
the impoundment of water. The deed reserved to the Browns the right to use the
land below the 800-foot contour, as follows:
Grantors shall have the right to possess and use said premises in any manner not inconsistent with the estate,
rights and privileges herein granted to
Appalachian, including (a) the right to
cross &aid land to reach the impounded
waters for recreational purposes and
for obtaining their domestic water supply and water for their livestock and
(b) the> right to extend and maintain
necessary fences across said land and
into the impounded waters for a sufficient distance to prevent livestock
from wading around said fences.
Moreover, the deed provided that the covenants and agreements contained therein
"shall be covenants attaching to and running with said premises."
date of hi* retirement on April 20, 19S7.
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By deed dated October 19, 1964, the
Browns conveyed to Dayton A. Haley and
Lucy S. Haley a portion of the remaining
land described by metes and bounds and
containing 17.26 acres, together with an
easement of right-of-way over other lands
of the Browns for ingress and egress.
This tract, as described, extended to the
800-foot elevation contour of Apco, the level to which it was expected the waters of
Smith Mountain Lake, when filled, would
extend.
The Haleys built a beach, piers, a campsite, and a trailer park for recreational use
of the waters of Smith Mountain Lake.
After being filled, however, the lake rose
to a water level that generally remains
within the 790-foot and 795-foot contours.
As a consequence, the Haleys' tract, adjoining the 800-foot contour, is usually separated from the lake waters by a strip of
land that varies in width, depending on the
terrain and the volume of the water collected in the lake.
In 1978, the Browns brought an action at
law against the Haleys for ejectment and
damages. The trial court sat without a
jury and the evidence was not transcribed.
By final order entered July 23, 1979, the
court found in favor of the Browns, ruling
that they were entitled to recover "sole
possession" of "all the land below the 800
foot contour as the [Haleys'] land borders
upon Smith Mountain Lake," but denied
the Browns' claim for damages.

action or threats to impede their access to
the lake.
The court sustained a demurrer of Apco
to the easement claim and motions to dismiss the remaining claims with respect to
Apco; no error was assigned to these rulings. Brown filed an answer in which he
denied that plaintiffs were entitled to the
relief sought and asserted that under the
doctrine of res judicata the adjudication in
the prior ejectment action barred the
present litigation.
Plaintiffs' claims
against Brown proceeded to trial before a
judge other than the one who had presided
in the ejectment action.
By letter opinion of August 10, 1983, the
trial court stated that, although the final
order entered in the earlier action was ambiguous, the ejectment action decided only
the fee simple ownership of the land below
the 800-foot contour and established the
boundary line between the Brown and Haley properties. Finding that the easement
issue was not identical to the title issue
previously resolved, the court was of opinion that the present proceeding was not
barred by res judicata.

In 1982, the Haleys and others 1 filed an
amended motion for declaratory judgment
and bill of complaint against Apco and
against Rufus R. Brown, who, upon the
death of Sallie W. Brown, had become vested with sole fee simple title to their land.
Plaintiffs asked the court to declare that
they had an easement to cross Brown's
land below the 800-foot contour to reach
the lake waters, to reform the 1964 deed
from the Browns to the Haleys, to declare
that the plaintiffs had riparian rights in the
lake, and to enjoin Brown from further

The court found that, at the time the
Haleys purchased the tract from the
Browns, the parties believed the lake waters would extend to the 800-foot contour,
so that the Haleys thought that their land
extended to the water's edge. In its letter
opinion the court stated that it was "implied, if not expressfly] agreed to by the
parties," that plaintiffs had a reasonable
expectation of reaching the lake water.
Because plaintiffs had made substantial improvements based on their belief that they
could cross the strip of land in question,
the court stated that to deny them the
right to cross it "would not only be inequitable but also unconscionable." Accordingly, the court was of opinion that plaintiffs were entitled to an implied easement
across the strip of land. After further
argument by counsel upon Brown's motion
for reconsideration, the court reaffirmed

1. The other plaintiffs were Ira Lewis Cooper,
Warren H. Slone, and Warner E. and Dorothy
Smith, all tenants of Haley's Trailer Court, and

William W. Hall, described as an invitee of
Haley's Trailer Court and member of the general public.
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The barring of a cause of action
"which could have been litigated" is
not directed ttf\an unrelated claim
which might permissibly have been
joined, but, to a claim which, if tried
separately, would constitute claimsplitting.
Id at 670-71 n. 4, 202 S.E.2d at 920-21 n. 4
(citations omitted). The test to determine
whether claims are part of a single cause
of action is whether the same evidence is
necessary to prove each claim. See Bates,
214 Va. at 672, 202 S.E.2d at 922; Cohen v.
Power, 183 Va. 258, 261, 32 S.E.2d 64, 65
(1944); Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 168
Va. 284, 290-91, 191 S.E. 608, 609-10
(1937). Cf. Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218,
223-24, 349 S.E.2d 125, 128-29 (1986);
Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 18, 109
S.E.2d 379, 384 (1959).
[2,3] Ejectment is an action at law to
determine title and right of possession of
real property. See Providence v. United
VcL/Seaboard Nat, 219 Va. 735, 744, 251
S.E.2d 474, 479 (1979); Benoit v. Baxter,
196 Va. 360, 365, 83 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1954).
Jt may be maintained by one who has an
interest in and a right to recover possession of the premises, or a share, interest, or
portion thereof. Code § 8.01-137. A verdict for the plaintiff must specify the share
or interest of the plaintiff, whether in the
whole or a part of the premises claimed,
and the estate of the plaintiff, whether in
fee, for life, or for a term of years. Code
§§ 8.01-152, -153. The action is concerned
[1] As Brown has noted, we said in only with the ownership rights of the plainBates that a judgment in favor of a party tiff, and the proof necessary to support the
"bars relitigation -of the same cause of action consists of the documents which vest
actum, or any part thereof which could title in the owner and any other evidence
have been litigated, between the same par- related to the issue of title.
ties and their privies." 214 Va. at 670-71,
[4-6] An easement, on the other hand,
202 S.E.2d at 920-21 (emphasis in original).
But we explicated this language in a foot- is a privilege to use the land of another in a
note:
particular manner and for a particular pur-

the opinions set forth in its letter of August 10, 1988.
By final order and decree entered December 7, 1983, the court overruled
Brown's plea of res judicata and ruled that
Dayton A. Haley and Lucy S. Haley, their
heirs and assigns, have an implied easement to enter upon and cross Brown's land
lying between the 800-foot contour line
bordering the Haleys' property and the waters of Smith Mountain Lake as the waters
rise and fall. The court also permanently
enjoined Brown from taking or threatening
any action to prevent the Haleys from exercising their right to enter and cross the
strip of land.
In this appeal, Brown * reiterates his argument that res judicata bars the maintenance of this suit because of the prior
ejectment action involving the parties or
their privies.3 Because his motion for
judgment in the prior action alleged that
the Haleys had "no interest" in the land
below the 800-foot elevation contour, he
contends that the existence of an easement
over the disputed portion of the property
was in issue and was decided adversely to
the Haleys. Citing Bates v. Devers, 214
Va. 667, 202 S.E.2d 917 (1974), he asserts
that res judicata bars relitigation of any
part of the same cause of action which was
or could have been previously litigated and
therefore precludes further litigation of the
easement issue.4 We do not agree.

2. Brown died after this appeal was granted.
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-20, we retained jurisdiction as though his death had not occurred.
3. Although the parties to the two proceedings
were not identical, there is no contention that
they were not parties in privity. We will assume, therefore, that this requisite of res judicata is satisfied.

4. Brown does not state whether plaintiffs' alternative requests for reformation of the deed
from the Browns to the Haleys or for a declaration of riparian rights are also barred by res
judicata, but we construe his argument as extending to these aspects of plaintiffs' suit with
equal force.
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ejectment to establish his title subject to
the easement
[8] The easement which the Haleys assert in this case cannot be proved by the
facts which proved in the ejectment action
that the Browns were the owners of the
disputed property. Plaintiffs assert a quasi-easement appurtenant to their land resulting from the express reservation in the
flowage right and-easement deed of the
Browns to Apco, the Browns1 use of the
property subject to this reservation prior to
their sale to the Haleys, and the "apparent,
continuous, and reasonably necessary"
character of this use of the property for
access to the lake waters. The necessary
proof of such an easement included the
deed to Apco reserving a right to use the
property for access to the water and evidence of the nature of the Browns' and
Haleys' use of the property. None of this
evidence was necessary to a determination
of title in the ejectment action. The two
claims—tiie Browns' action in ejectment
[7] The existence of an easement is not and plaintiffs' claim of an easement—were
relevant to the issue of title. In King v. not part of the same cause of action beNorfolk & W.R. Co., 99 Va. 625, 631-32, 39 cause there was no identity of facts necesS.E. 701, 704 (1901), we held that a plaintiff sary to prove each claim.
Had the Haleys asserted and demonstratwith only a right to use the unemployed
lands of the defendant could not maintain ed an easement in the ejectment action,
an ejectment action because his assertion they could not have defeated the Browns'
of a right to use the land was not an claim of ownership of the property. Reynassertion of title to any estate contem- olds, 83 Va. at 825-26, 3 S.E. at 714-15;
plated by the ejectment statutes.6 More- Boiling, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) at 572-73. Nor
over, in Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 825, could the court have granted the relief they
3 S.E. 710, 714 (1887), we held that a de- now seek, as it is equitable in nature and
fendant's right to enter, quarry, and re- the ejectment action was at law. See Logomove limestone was not a proper defense no v. Dozier, 91 Va. 492, 505-07, 22 S.E.
to an ejectment action. Where such right 239, 240-41 (1895) (court was powerless in
was asserted, however, the verdict should ejectment action to reform deed where parhave been for the plaintiff, confirming title ty contended that, because of mutual misin him subject to the defendant's right to take, it did not reflect the intent of the
enter and quarry. Id. at 825-26, 3 S.E. at parties). The Haleys' recourse was to file
714-15. Finally, in Boiling v. Mayor, etc., a separate suit in equity, as they have
24 Va. (3 Rand.) 563, 572-73 (1825) (predat- done, to have an easement declared. Cf.
ing the ejectment statutes), although the Stanardsville Vol Fire Co. v. Berry, 229
town of Petersburg held an easement for a Va. 578, 584-85, 331 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1985)
highway over the land of the owner, the (defendant in trespass action at law could
owner could nevertheless bring an action in resort to equity for a determination of the
pose. It creates a burden on the servient
tract and requires that the owner of that
land refrain from interfering with the privilege conferred for the benefit of the dominant tract Bunn v. Qffutt, 216 Va. 681,
684, 222 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1976); Tardy v.
Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 556 (1886). The privilege enjoyed under an easement is not inconsistent with "a general property" in the
owner of the servient tract Bunn, 216
Va. at 684, 222 S.E.2d at 525. Establishment and protection of an easement by
injunction are equitable remedies. See
Mobley v. Saponi, 215 Va. 643, 645, 212
S.E.2d 287, 289 (1975); e.g., Robertson v.
Robertson, 214 Va. 76, 197 S.E.2d 183
(1973); Cushman Corporation v. Barnes,
204 Va. 245, 129 S.E.2d 633 (1963);
Williams v. Green, 111 Va. 205, 68 S.E.
253 (1910). The proof necessary to justify
equitable relief includes evidence of the
facts that give rise to the easement, whether by express grant or reservation, by implication, or by other means.

5. But see dictum to the contrary in the earlier
case of Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 820, 3 S.E.

710, 712 (1887).
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existence of an easement over the property
at issue). Indeed, the ejectment statutes
expressly preserve a defendant's right to
resort to equity for any relief to which he
is entitled See Code § 5.01-148. The Haleys and their privies, therefore, are not
barred from bringing this suit in equity to
establish their right to cross Brown's property to reach the lake waters and to enjoin
Brown's interference with their use of this
easement1
Brown £lso contends, as he did below,
that the Haleys are not entitled to cross his
land below the 800-foot contour for access
to the lake waters. He says the court
erred in finding an implied easement from
preexisting use, or quasi-easement, because
certain elements necessary to a finding of
such easement were lacking. We do not
agree.

Brown contends that the land in question
had not been put to a use that was continuous, apparent, necessary, and in existence
at the time of the ^conveyance. Although
there was some conflict in the testimony,
the evidence of plaintiffs showed that when
the Haleys were negotiating the purchase
of the property, the Browns had already
conveyed rights in the land below the 800foot contour to Agco. The land had already been cleared by Apco for development of the lake, and the Browns were
openly exercising their reserved right to
use the land below the 800-foot level by
grazing their cattle there. In 1964, the
year the Haleys purchased their tract from
the Browns, the Browns were using parts
of their land between the 800-foot contour
and the water for recreational purposes.
[11] This evidence, together with the
existence of a recorded reservation running
with the land of the right to use the property to reach the lake for recreational purposes, was sufficient to support a finding
that ttie use of the property below the
800-foot contour was continuous, apparent,
and in existence at the time of the conveyance to the Haleys. Even if the character
of the use changed—from grazing cattle to
recreational use—this change does not preclude recognition of an easement where the
use is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property. See Fones, 214 Va.
at 90, 196 S.E.2d at 918; Keen v. Coal
Company, 203 Va. 175, 179, 122 S.E.2d
648, 647 (1961).

[9,10] Absent express restrictions imposed by the terms of the grant, a grantor
of property conveys everything that is necessary for the beneficial use and enjoyment
of the property. Middleion v. Johnston,
221 Va. 797, 802, 273 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1981);
Fones v. Fagan, 214 Va. 87, 90,196 S.E.2d
916, 918 (1973); Jennings v. IAneberry,
180 Va. 44, 48, 21 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1942);
Scott v. Moore, 98 Va. 668, 675, 37 S.E.
842, 344 (1900). From this principle is derived the concept of an implied easement
from preexisting use. Middleion, 221 Va.
at 802, 273 S.E.2d at 803; Fones, 214 Va.
at 90,196 S.E.2d at 918; Jennings, 180 Va.
at 48, 21 S.E.2d at 771. When a landowner
conveys a portion of his land, he impliedly
conveys an easement for any use that is
continuous, apparent, reasonably necessary
for the enjoyment of the property conveyed, and in existence at the time of the
conveyance. Haynie v. Brenner, 216 Va.
722, 724, 222 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1976); Fones,
214 Va. at 90-91,196 S.E.2d at 919; Sander/tn r. Baxter, 76 Va. 299, 305 (1882).
&e generally 1 R. Minor, The Law of Real
Property §§ 97, 99 (F. Ribble 2d ed. 1928).

[12,13] Brown asserts, however, that
the use to which the Haleys have put the
property below the 800-foot level does not
meet the necessity requirement For an
easement to arise by implication from a
preexisting use, the plaintiffs must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the
use is a reasonable necessity, not an absolute physical necessity. Middleton v.
Johnston, 221 Va. at 803, 273 S.E.2d at
803; Fones, 214 Va. at 90, 196 S.E.2d at
918; Keen, 203 Va. at 179, 122 S.E.2d at

** For the same reasons, they are not barred
from bringing their claims for reformation of
the deed from the Browns to the Haleys and for
declaration of their riparian rights. Each of
these forms of relief was equitable in nature

and could not have been granted if sought in the
ejectment action at law. Moreover, the proof
necessary to sustain a claim based on each of
these theories was not the same as that required
in the ejectment action.
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546; Jennings, 180 Va. at 48, 21 S.E.2d at
771. The existence of reasonable necessity
depends on the circumstances of each particular case. Jones v. Beavers, 221 Va.
214, 221, 269 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1980).
[14] In this case, the Haleys met their
burden. Their evidence, accepted by the
trial court, shows that access to the water
was within the contemplation of the parties
in negotiating and entering into the contract for the sale of the property. When
she first saw the property, Mrs. Haley discussed with Brown the soil and terrain and
their suitability for development of a beach
and boat landings. The Haleys' sole purpose in buying the tract was to acquire
waterfront property for recreational use.
Following their purchase, they developed
the property for such use, building a beach,
piers, docks, bathhouses, and other facilities related to water sports and recreation.
The plaintiffs' evidence was that the property was virtually worthless to the Haleys
and their tenants without access to the
water.
[15] Where the parties to a land transaction contemplate that the purchasers will
have access to the water for recreational
purposes and where such access adds materially to the value of the property conveyed, use of the property retained for
access to the water is reasonably necessary
for the beneficial use and enjoyment of the
property conveyed.7 See Ulbricht v. Friedsam, 159 Tex. 607, 618-20, 325 S.W.2d 669,
676-77 (1959). The court did not err in
finding an implied easement across
Brown's land for access to the water.
Worthy of special note is the case of
Ulbricht v. Friedsam, in which the Supreme Court of Texas considered claims of
parties in substantially the same positions
as the parties in this case. There, the
defendant's predecessor in title had granted an easement to a development company
to overflow her land to the 1020-foot contour, reserving to herself the right of access to the water and the right to use the
7. Cf. Jones v. Beavers, 221 Va. 214, 269 S.E.2d
775 (1980), where plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of showing an implied easement in a
landing because they offered as evidence only

land to the water's edge. These reservations were expressly made to run with the
land. Defendant later conveyed 386 acres,
described by metes and bounds as extending to the 1020-foot contour line, to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought suit to try title to
the land below the 1020-foot contour, to
recover the right of ingress and egress to
and from the waters of the lake, and to
reform the deed by which the property was
conveyed. 159 Tex. at 609-11, 617, 325
S.W.2d at 670-71, 675.
The court rejected plaintiffs' contentions
that the 1020-foot contour was a meander
line and not a boundary line or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs took title to the lake
bed between the 1020-foot contour and the
original bank of the river that formed the
lake as a matter of law because the deed
described the property as adjacent to the
lake. The court ruled that the language of
the deed was unambiguous and did not
convey any land below the 1020-foot contour. Id at 612-16, 325 S.W.2d at 672-74.
Turning to the question whether plaintiffs had an easement over the property
below the 1020-foot contour, the court noted certain facts related to the use. Defendant had grazed cattle on the land prior
to its sale to plaintiffs. During their negotiations, defendant represented to plaintiffs
that the land fronted on the lake for 3% to
4 miles. Following the sale, plaintiffs subdivided 20 acres along the water's edge
into lakefront lots, and the occupants of
these lots used the lake for boating and
fishing without complaint from defendant
for some time. Moreover, other parts of
the property fronting on the lake contained
facilities built for recreational use of the
lake, and this condition existed and was
apparent at the time of the sale to plaintiffs. Id. at 616-17, 325 S.W.2d at 675.
Citing the law of implied easement or quasi-easement, the Texas court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover as an
easement the rights of defendant to use
and enjoy the surface land below the 1020the documents of conveyance—deeds and related plats—but no further proof of the circumstances surrounding their purchase of the property.
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ioot contour line, limited to the extent that "relative to the work (excluding coal seversuch use was reasonably necessary to the ance tax)'1 obligated contractor to pay all
use and enjoyment of the land as lakefront taxes related to coal mining operation other
property. Id. at 618-20, 325 S.W.2d at than the tax expressly excluded by the
67G-77.8
contract and obligated it to pay the black
lung
excise tax, notwithstanding Internal
Similarly, we hold that the Haleys have
Revenue
Service regulation stating that the
an implied easement, which runs with the
tax
is
one
imposed upon the owner of the
land, to use the land of Brown below the
coal.
SW^foot contour for access to the water
for recreational use. Accordingly, we will
affirm the judgment of the trial court
Mark M. Lawson, White, Elliott & BunAffirmed.
dy, Abingdon, on brief, for appellant
No brief or argument for appellee.
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WESTBURY COAL MINING
PARTNERSHIP
v.
J.S. & K. COAL CORPORATION.
Record No. 831660.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
April 24, 1987.
Lessee of land appealed from order of
the Circuit Court, Tazewell County, Nicholas E. Persin and Robert L. Powell, JJ.,
entered in favor of contractor in action to
determine rights under mining contract
with respect to payment of black lung excise tax. The Supreme Court, Poff, J., held
that contract obligated contractor to pay
the tax.
Reversed and remanded.
Mines and Minerals <s=>109
Contract which obligated contractor to
"pay all fees and taxes, required by law"
8. Two justices dissented from that portion of the
opinion which denied ownership of the land
below the 1020-foot contour. Construing Texas
law, these justices would have held that plaintiffs owned the adjacent property below the
1020-foot contour to the bank of the river
which formed the lake. 159 Tex. at 621-27, 325

Present CARRICO, CJ., and COCHRAN,' POFF, COMPTON, STEPHENSON,
RUSSELL and THOMAS, JJ.
POFF, Justice.
This appeal questions the chancellor's
construction of a written contract
Westbury Coal Mining Partnership
(Westbury) is a limited partnership, and
J.S. & K. Coal Corporation (the contractor)
is a corporation. Both were organized under the laws of the Commonwealth with
principal offices in Richlands. By contract
dated January 1, 1980, the contractor
agreed to conduct coal mining operations
on land leased to Westbury. Subsection
18(b) of Article IV of the contract provided
that the contractor "shall pay all fees and
taxes, required by law, and shall comply
with all laws, ordinances, governmental
rules and regulations relative to the work
(excluding coal severance tax)." The contract required the contractor to furnish
Westbury "[cjopies of all documents or
forms [evidencing] compliance with this
subsection".
At that time, the federal government imposed an excise tax of 50 cents per ton on
the sale of each ton of coal produced from
underground mines. 26 U.S.C. § 4121(a)(1)
(1982). The revenues were used to finance
S.W.2d at 67&-S2. The dissent did not address
the easement issue.
* Justice Cochran participated in the hearing and
decision of this case prior to the effective date
of his retirement on April 20, 1987.

